Internet Telephony services offer several new business opportunities to telecommunication providers. However, they also introduce several security flaws that can be exploited by various attacks, thus raising the need for the employment of suitable security measures during the provision of the service. Signaling attacks, a type of Denial of Service attacks, are an indicative example. In this paper we present a cost-effective mechanism, namely the Integrity-Auth mechanism, for protecting SIP-based telephony services from signaling attacks. The focus is on the evaluation of the mechanism in terms of the processing overheads that it introduces in various different scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
Applications and services employed in open architectures, like the Internet, do not only inherit the benefits resulting from the characteristics of such architectures, but also the new security threats that are inevitably raised. Ιt is well known that Internet's protocols are susceptible to a plethora of vulnerabilities and attacks [1] [2] . Furthermore, attackers keep on searching for new security flaws of the Internet protocol stack. Consequently, Internet should be considered as a hostile environment, at least by any critical real-time application like Internet Telephony.
Today there are various researchers that have identified security flaws in Internet Telephony Services (ITS) [3] - [6] , mainly focusing on those utilizing the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [7] as their signaling protocol. The SIP "preference" originates from the fact that SIP has been adopted by various standardization organizations as the predominant protocol for both wireline and wireless world in the Next Generation Networks (NGN) era. One of the most important vulnerabilities is the fact that a malicious user may illegally modify selected session parameters and thus launch a signaling attack [3] . In such cases the malicious user sends a carefully crafted (well formed) SIP message in order to either cause a Denial of Service (by illegally terminating a session, by modifying the voice parameters etc.), or to gain unauthorized access to the provided service.
It is therefore necessary for SIP realms to employ the appropriate security mechanism in order to protect ITSs against signaling attacks. Currently, there are very few attempts, published in the literature, addressing this issue [8] [9] . Particularly, [8] presents a mechanism that could be utilized against the BYE signaling attack. The main idea of this mechanism is based on cross protocol intrusion detection, recognizing a BYE signaling attack if voice data (RTP messages) follow the terminating signaling message BYE, during some specific time window. The main drawback of that solution is that a malicious user can bypass the aforementioned detection mechanism if before sending the BYE message to the other participant he causes a DoS situation. Furthermore, a malicious user can generate false alarms by sending voice data after the legitimate user has sent the terminating SIP BYE message. Finally, this scheme does not protect end users against man-in-the-middle signaling attacks. On the other hand, [9] presents a pro-active security mechanism that protects SIP's session responses against illegal modifications and guarantees their authenticity and integrity. This means that the latter solution is effective in cases of man-in-the-middle attacks where the malicious user acts as a proxy generating spoofed responses, offering security services to only one of the participants (the caller) of a multimedia session and not to the other (the callee). As a result the specific mechanism cannot be utilized to provide protection against all types of signaling attacks. Thus, more advanced mechanisms are necessary in order to improve the security level of SIP based internet telephony services.
In this paper we present and evaluate, through different scenarios, a practical and cost-effective approach, namely the Integrity-Auth mechanism [10] , that can be applied in SIP based services for protecting them against signaling attacks. The rest of paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the signaling attacks that can be launched against SIP based services. Section 3 presents the proposed protection mechanism, while section 4 evaluates the Integrity-Auth scheme in terms of the overhead introduced at the SIP server side, as well as at the end-user terminal. Section 5 concludes the paper.
SIGNALING ATTACKS
A signaling attack could be defined as any attempt to illegally modify the specific session of a state (i.e. terminating, canceling, updating) in order to either cause a DoS or to gain unauthorized access to the provided service. Signaling attacks exploit the fact that there are no appropriate authentication and integrity check mechanisms [3] developed for SIP realms. Furthermore, the easy access to the IP-based networks gives the chance to malicious users to "discover" the parameters required for launching such an attack. Specifically, consider the case where a legitimate user initiates a call by sending the appropriate SIP INVITE message. The malicious user, who wishes to cancel this specific session, should first identify the corresponding parameters of the initial SIP INVITE message, by utilizing sniffing tools like Wireshark (http://www.wireshark.org/). Following that, at any future time the malicious user can craft the appropriate SIP CANCEL message in order to terminate the pending session, without the legal user realizing the reason for which his request has been canceled. The steps followed during this type of attack are depicted in Figure 1 . More details about signaling attacks can be found in [3] . 
THE INTEGRITY-AUTH SCHEME 3.1 General Description
As already mentioned, today there is no appropriate mechanism for validating the authenticity and integrity of a SIP message. To this direction, [10] has suggested the introduction of the IntegrityAuth scheme. The Integrity-Auth, as its name implies, offers integrity and authenticity services, shielding SIP based ITS against signaling attacks. This is achieved through the introduction of a new header named Integrity-Auth, which includes the appropriate credentials for validating both message integrity and authenticity. The grammar of the proposed IntegrityAuth header is presented in Figure 2 , while the corresponding credential value is computed through the following formula:
Head.-Val=Hash(SIP_Message|Random,Hash(PWD|Random) (1) Note that only legally authorized users can generate the credential values that correspond to a specific SIP message. Besides, the malicious user is unable to find the user's password from the integrity-auth value, as hash functions are irreversible. However, if the user's password has been revealed, then the security of the entire scheme is sacrificed, as is the case in any password-based system.
Integrity-Auth="Integrity-Auth" HCOLON integrity-auth-value integrity-auth-value= credentials-value;algrotithm;nonce algorithm="algorithm" EQUAL alg-value alg-value="MD5|SHA1" credentials-value=quoted-string Figure 2 . Integrity-Auth Header Grammar Whenever a SIP entity, which employs the Integrity-Auth scheme, receives a SIP message (e.g a request), it extracts the initial value of the Integrity-Auth header and checks its validity by recomputing the Integrity Auth value according to formula (1); if the SIP entity is a SIP UA terminal the password is provided by the user, otherwise it should be searched at the corresponding database. If the two values match the processing of the message continues, otherwise the received message is discarded and an alarm for a signaling attack is triggered. Figure 3 provides the message flow for validating the genuineness of a SIP message. Consider the CANCEL signaling attack described in Section 2, where a malicious user cancels illegally a pending session. Let us assume that the SIP end-user and the corresponding SIP proxy incorporate the Integrity-Auth scheme. Under this context, both SIP entities would be able to recognize and discard malicious messages that may affect the stability of the session. Specifically, the malicious user's SIP CANCEL message (see message 4 in Figure 1 ) will be rejected by the proxy, before any additional processing takes place, as the Integrity-Auth value that will be computed by the SIP proxy will not match the one extracted from the received SIP CANCEL message. This will occur because the malicious user does not have knowledge of the user password which is required to compute the Integrity-Auth value.
EVALUATION
In order to proceed with an initial evaluation of the Integrity-Auth scheme, we have implemented it into:
1. The pjsua SIP User Agent (UA); a SIP soft phone based on pjsip project [11] .
2. The SIP Express Router (SER) [12] ; a SIP proxy.
As far as the cryptographic operations are concerned, the OpenSSL library [13] has been utilized, while in our configuration the MD5 hash function has been invoked.
The architecture of the experimental test-bed is depicted in Figure  4 , while the specific characteristics of the components are given at Table 1 . 
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Considering that the main objective of this experiment is to identify the overheads, in terms of processing time, introduced by the Integrity-Auth scheme, three different scenarios have been implemented. In each scenario different background traffic towards the SIP proxy has been generated (see Table 2 for more details), while the following processing times have been recorded: At this point, it should be stated that in order to illustrate potential variations regarding the overhead introduced by different architectures, the SIP UA has been installed in a Macbook laptop as well as in a Linux based personal computer (see Table 1 for system characteristics). Furthermore, for facilitating comparison, all scenarios have been realized with and without embedding the Integrity-Auth scheme into the SIP entities. Observing the aforementioned processing times it can be deduced that the total average delay introduced by the Integrity-Auth scheme for Linux systems is approximately 230 microseconds, whereas for MAC systems is approximately 5000 microseconds (see also Figures 9 and 10 ). This is mainly due to the different way the two operating systems handle the SIP UA, as no other characteristic of the test bed architecture was modified. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the pjsip-project [11] and the OpenSSL library are designed mainly for Linux based systems, thus affecting the overall system performance when employed in different operating systems.
Regarding the time for creating a request and validating a response, it can be noticed that it varies between the different operating systems that the SIP UA has been installed. In the case of Linux the average time for request generation and response validation is around 120 and 100 microseconds correspondingly, whereas for the MAC the same times are approximately 230 and 290 microseconds; which means almost double the time of the Linux based system. Tables 7 to 10 Considering the delay introduced by the SIP proxiy in the overall processing time, it is negligible since the average processing time including request validation and the generation of response is approximately 120 microseconds. Tables 11 and 12 show the statistical metrics for the request validation and response generation accordingly. To sum up, the Integrity-Auth scheme proves to be an effective and practical solution for shielding SIP based services against signaling attacks, even for SIP UA that perform "poor" in specific systems, like the SIP UA installed in a MAC system. Assuming the latter's performance as the worst case, the total processing time will not exceed 5000 microseconds. On top of that, it should be stressed that the measured processing times include the time consumed for the logging operation itself. Consequently, the overhead introduced by the integrity-auth mechanism would be even smaller.
CONCLUSIONS
ITSs based on SIP should be able to protect all network elements against security flaws and potential attacks. Although, up to now only very few real security incidents regarding ITSs, have been reported, it is almost inevitable that a malicious user will try and eventually succeed to exploit a specific ITS vulnerability. It is therefore crucial to employ the appropriate countermeasures. In this paper we have briefly discussed the problem of signaling attacks as well as an appropriate security mechanism, namely the Integrity-Auth mechanism. The Integrity-Auth scheme has been experimentally evaluated, in terms of the processing overheads it introduces, in two different operating systems. The derived results demonstrate that the introduced overhead is negligible, providing at the same time adequate protection of SIP based ITSs against signaling attacks.
